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Heterogeneity of marginal shipping costs leads to persistent and volatile deviations in
real exchange rate. In a two-country, three-good endowment general equilibrium model,
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of one price deviations and trade-inducing and suppressing substitution effects due to
heterogeneity in trade costs. When endowments follow an AR(1) process that matches
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1 Introduction
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This paper explains persistence and volatility of real exchange rate deviations as a result
of heterogeneous shipping costs in a dynamic general equilibrium framework with arbitrage
trade. In a two-country three-good endowment model with identical households, arbitrage
trading firms chose trade volumes in response to profitable arbitrage opportunities. Because
the marginal shipping costs are heterogeneous (motivated by the heterogeneity of physical
characteristics important in shipment) a country-specific shock may lead to trade in some
goods but not in others. Moreover, the heterogeneity leads to substitution effects between
traded and non-traded goods within each country. This substitution can induce or suppress
trade and has a measurable influence on the dynamic properties of the real exchange rate. A
careful calibration of the model matches persistence of the real exchange rate in the data and,
when adjustment costs are added, also generates volatility in real exchange rate deviations.
The concept of purchasing power parity (PPP) maintains that national price levels should
be equal when expressed in the units of a common currency (Cassel 1918). Translated into
observables, it states that the real exchange rate should be constant. The central puzzle
in the international business cycle literature is that fluctuations in the real exchange rate
are very large and persistent. Traditional attempts to address this puzzle based on the
Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson objection to PPP (Balassa 1961) are empirically unwarranted
for developed countries (e.g., Engel 1999)2. In particular, many empirical studies document
large, volatile and persistent deviations in the prices of traded goods across countries. Several
avenues have been explored to motivate the deviations in prices of traded goods from parity.
Betts and Devereux (2000) and Bergin and Feenstra (2001) find that pricing to market with
segmented markets and nominal rigidities creates volatile deviations in the real exchange
rate. A year-long price stickiness combined with a low degree of intertemporal elasticity of
substitution and consumption - leisure separable preferences generates sufficient volatility
1I thank Michael B. Devereux, John F. Helliwell and James M. Nason for their encouragement and support.
I have also benefited from discussions with Jenny Xu and Henry Siu. All errors and omissions are mine.
2Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (HBS) objection is based on the relative price of traded and non-traded goods.
Engel (1999) shows that in the U.S. data, no more than 2% of the variation in the real exchange rate can be
attributed to the fluctuations in the relative price of non-traded to traded goods. HBS proposition holds holds
better for emerging and developing economies, and at lower frequencies. See, i.a., Choudhri & Khan (2004)
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but not sufficient persistence in the real exchange rate (Devereux 1997, Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan 2002). A distribution costs approach (e.g., Corsetti and Dedola 2005, Burstein,
Neves and Rebello 2003) justifies wedges between the prices of tradable goods by very large
costs to product distribution (up to 60% of product price) in order to match the volatility
of the real exchange rate. Differences in preferences across countries have also been used to
rationalize deviations from the law of one price (e.g., Lapham and Vigneault 2001) but rely
on volatile and highly persistent shocks to preference substitution parameters to match the
observed fluctuations in the prices of traded goods. Finally, models of the costs of arbitrage
trade were so far unsuccessful in generating sufficiently persistent law of one price deviations
(e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000, Dumas 1992, Ohanian and Stockman 1997, Canjels, Prakash-
Canjels and Taylor 2004, Sercu, Uppal and van Hulle 1995)3.
Recent evidence (e.g., O’Connel and Wei 2002, Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis 2005)
shows that law of one price deviations behave in a threshold non-linear and heterogeneous
way. Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) find that threshold estimates for sectoral RERs are signifi-
cantly related to exchange rate volatility and city distances, a result which holds also at an
international level and at various frequencies (Zussman 2002). Imbs et. al. (2003) confirm
this at a sectoral level. Berka (2009) finds that, at the level of individual goods, heterogeneity
of marginal transport costs, proxied by price-to-weight ratios, explains a large part of the
variation in thresholds and conditional half-lives of price differences. Prices of heavier or more
voluminous goods deviate further before becoming mean reverting, suggesting that shipping
costs are important in explaining heterogeneous behaviour of law of one price deviations4.
The two general equilibrium models presented in this paper show how heterogeneity of
shipping costs can explain persistence and volatility in deviations of good prices – and the
real exchange rate – from parity. Three goods which only differ by their marginal shipping
costs (physical weight) are traded for arbitrage purposes5. Arbitrage trading firms decide
3The border effect literature tries to understand the vastly higher density of trade flows when two equidis-
tant locations are separated by a border. This phenomenon also includes a very high cross-border price
volatility of identical products, and is therefore closely related to literature on real exchange rates. See, i.a.,
Engel and Rogers 1996, and Jenkins and Rogers (1995).
4 Hummels (1999) documents that shipping costs depend on weight or volume of the transported goods.
5Because the purpose of this paper is to explain price differences and not trade volume, the modelling
approach does not require existence of a large amount of arbitrage trade to be justified. A threat of arbitrage
is sufficient in keeping a check on price deviations. Arbitrage trade can also be thought of as a limiting case of
specialized production and trade of substitutable goods and offers a simple way of introducing shipping costs
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on the timing and magnitude of trade to maximize their profits by comparing marginal
revenues (proportional to the size of the price difference and trade volume) with arbitrage
costs (proportional to shipping distance and the heterogeneous good friction). In the second
model, arbitrage costs also include quadratic adjustment costs in the change of trade volume.
This makes large changes in the volume of trade more than proportionately costly due to
adjustments in legal contracts, infrastructure, such as costs of establishing new (or changing
existing) business relationships and distribution networks. Firms then optimally smooth the
trade volume leading to more volatile price differentials.
Equilibrium in both models has three notable characteristics. First, the tradability of
goods is determined endogenously by the endowment shock and the physical characteristics
the product. Second, price differences exhibit threshold non-linearity. Size of the symmetric
threshold in the linear model equals the marginal trade cost. Third, size of the law of one price
deviation depends on physical characteristics of all products and their endowments. General
equilibrium effects due to substitution among traded and non-traded goods in each country
can induce or suppress trade and affect the real exchange rate distribution. Logarithm of
the real exchange rate exhibits a string-type nonlinearity6. For large deviations from parity,
thresholds of all RER components are crossed, yielding a stronger mean-reverting tendency
and a larger arbitrage trade volume. Real exchange rate persistence declines in the volatility
of the endowment shock process and increases in the persistence of the endowment shocks
and in the trade friction. Volatility of the real exchange rate increases in all three of the
above factors (it is concave in shock volatility).
A careful calibration of the first model matches the persistence of real exchange rate found
in the data, while producing meaningful persistence and co-movements of various price- and
quantity- constructs. However, due to small size of transportation friction and instantaneous
adjustment, volatility of RER is low. The quadratic adjustment cost model yields a dynamic
and highly non-linear model which retains its core features but improves results in a dynamic
environment. It goes a long way towards matching both RER persistence and volatility while
giving qualitatively meaningful results along other dimensions.
into the model.
6This is an empirical regularity, documented by Taylor, Peel and Sarno 2001, Kilian and Taylor 2003 who
show that smooth-threshold AR models provide a better empirical description of the data.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss models with
linear heterogeneous shipping costs and quadratic adjustment costs, respectively. Section 4
analyzes stochastic properties of the real exchange rate and section 5 discusses parameter
calibration. Section 6 analyzes persistence, comovement and volatility of the real exchange
rate and other variables. Section 7 concludes.
2 General equilibrium model of arbitrage trade
The two-country world consists of households and arbitrage trading firms. Each country
is endowed with positive amounts of three tradable goods. Goods differ in their physical
characteristics, proxied here by their weight.
2.1 Households
A representative household at Home chooses its consumption path to maximize instantaneous
CES utility function subject to a resource budget constraint:
max
C1t,C2t,C3t
∞∑
t=1
βt
{
1
1− θ
[
γ
1
θ
1 C
1− 1
θ
1t + γ
1
θ
2 C
1− 1
θ
2t + γ
1
θ
3 C
1− 1
θ
3t
]1−θ}
s.t. p1tC1t + p2tC2t + C3t = p1tY1t + p2tY2t + Y3t +
1
2
APt (1)
given APt and Yit, i = {1, 2}, where Yit is an endowment of good i at time t, ∑3i=1 γi = 1,
θ > 1, pit (i = 1, 2) is the relative price of goods i to good 3 and APt is the amount of
current-period arbitrage profits transferred to the household from a firm, assuming an equal
splitting rule between households at home and abroad. The first order conditions for this
problem imply the usual demand functions:
C1t = γ1p−θ1t
Yt
P 1−θt
(2)
C2t = γ2p−θ2t
Yt
P 1−θt
(3)
C3t = γ3
Yt
P 1−θt
(4)
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where Yt is home country’s real GDP expressed in the units of good 3 (Yt = p1tY1t+ p2tY2t+
Y3t + 12APt) and Pt is a composite price index Pt = (γ1p
1−θ
1t + γ2p
1−θ
2t + γ3)
1
1−θ ). Preferences
of households at Home and Abroad are identical, with prices abroad denoted by an asterix.
2.2 Arbitrage trading firms
There is a representative arbitrage trading firm in each country. It chooses the time and
amount traded of each good, taking into account the transportation costs.
max
N1,N2
AΠt = max
N1,N2
∞∑
t=1
βtAPt
= max
N1,N2
∞∑
t=1
βt
[
3∑
i=1
(p∗it − pit)Nit − T (N1t, N2t)
]
(5)
where Nit is the amount of trade in good i (N > 0 implies exports from Home to Abroad)
and T (N1t, N2t) is the cost function of the arbitrage trading firm. An arbitrage firm has
to purchase T (N1, N2) units of good 3 to trade {N1, N2}. It is assumed that good 3 has
zero trade friction, implying that the law of one price always holds for this good7. The cost
function is linear in the heterogeneous trade friction ti:
T (N1t, N2t) = (t1|N1t|+ t2|N2t|) = (aw1|N1t|+ aw2|N2t|)
where ti is assumed to be a linear function of the weight of a good i wi and a positive constant
homogeneous component of the shipping cost a8. The first order conditions for the arbitrage
trading firm approximately yield:
I(N)(p∗i − pi) = awi iff |Ni| > 0 (6)
I(N)(p∗i − pi) < awi iff Ni = 0 for i = 1, 2
7The assumption of zero trade friction is innocuous. A positive friction for each good would make the
computation more complicated but would not change the results qualitatively. Parameters t1 and t2 can be
thought of as trade frictions of goods 1 and 2 relative to the trade friction of good 3.
8a can be thought of as a per-kilogram fraction of good 3 which is used when a good is transported between
Home and Abroad. For the sake of simplicity and expositional clarity, insurance costs, costs of setting up
distribution networks, and other costs are ignored in this specification.
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where I(N) is an indicator function, such that I(N)= 1 when N ≥ 0, I(N)= −1 otherwise.
Trade occurs when the marginal revenue of arbitrage (left-hand side of (6)) exceeds the
marginal cost (right-hand side (6)). Trade leads to price convergence, and stops when all
profit opportunities are eliminated and absolute value of price difference equals marginal
trade cost. FOCs hold with inequality only in autarky. It is intuitive to rewrite (6) as:
−a ≤
MRA per kg︷ ︸︸ ︷
p∗i − pi
wi
≤
MCA per kg︷︸︸︷
a i = 1, 2
The middle part of this inequality captures the marginal revenue of arbitrage per kilogram
of good i (MRA) and the outside parts represent the marginal arbitrage cost per kilogram of
good i (MCA). While MCA is identical across goods, MRA is not. Goods that are relatively
heavier (or for another reason have a larger marginal shipping cost) need a larger price
difference in order for MRA to exceed MCA. Thus, maximum law of one price deviation for
each good proportional to its weight:
LOPD︷ ︸︸ ︷
|p∗1 − p1| ≤ t1 (7)
|p∗2 − p2| ≤ t2 (8)
This leads to heterogeneous filtering. Consider an endowment shock x which leads to an
identical law of one price deviation for goods 1 and 2. The value of x can be divided into
three subsets in terms of its effect on the price deviations. x ∈ [0, x∗1) results in autarky
because the law of one price deviations for goods 1 and 2 are in a no-trade region (|LOPDi| <
ti ⇐⇒ MRi < MCi i = 1, 2). For x ∈ [x∗1, x∗2), only the lighter good (thereafter good 1) is
traded because autarky price difference exceeds t1 but not t2: |LOPD1| > t1 ⇐⇒ MR1 >
MC1, |LOPD2| < t2 ⇐⇒MR2 < MC2. For x ∈ [x∗2,∞), all goods are traded as respective
autarky price differences exceed ti (|LOPDi| > ti ⇐⇒MRi > MCi i = 1, 2).
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2.3 Market clearing
Three goods markets clear at home as well as abroad. The direction of trade in goods 1 and
2 depends on the size and sign of the initial deviation from a law of one price, as determined
by the endowments. With two countries, Ni ≡ EXPi = IMP ∗i = −EXP ∗i ≡ −N∗i . The
market clearing conditions can then be written as:
C1 +N1 = Y1, C∗1 −N1 = Y ∗1 (9)
C2 +N2 = Y2, C∗2 −N2 = Y ∗2 (10)
C3 +N3 + 12T (N1, N2) = Y3, C
∗
3 −N3 +
1
2
T (N1, N2) = Y ∗3 (11)
2.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a set of prices and quantities {p1, p∗1, p2, p∗2, C1, C∗1 , C2, C∗2 , C3, C∗3 , N1,
N2, N3} such that the households maximize their utility (equations (1)-(4)), arbitrage trading
firms maximize their profits (eqs. (7) to (8)) and markets clear (eqs. (9) - (11)).
2.4.1 Frictionless trade
Without transportation costs (ti = 0), profit maximization problem faced by the firm implies
that law of one price holds for all goods (p∗i = pi, i ∈ {1, 2}). The equilibrium relative prices
then depend on the world endowments and the preference parameters:
pi
pj
=
p∗i
p∗j
=
[
Y Wj
Y Wi
γi
γj
] 1
θ
∀ i (12)
where Y Wi ≡ Yi + Y ∗i . The equilibrium consumption levels are
C1 = Y1
(
γ1
γ2
) 1
θ
(
YW2
YW1
) 1
θ
+ Y2Y1(
γ1
γ2
) 1
θ
(
YW2
YW1
) 1
θ
+ Y
W
2
YW1
, C2 = Y1
Y W2
Y W1
(
γ1
γ2
) 1
θ
(
YW2
YW1
) 1
θ
+ Y2Y1(
γ1
γ2
) 1
θ
(
YW2
YW1
) 1
θ
+ Y
W
2
YW1
and similarly for C∗1 and C∗2 . Ci = Yi, C∗i = Y ∗i iff
Y1
Y2
= Y
∗
1
Y ∗2
. Country which is endowed with
a relatively larger amount of good i will export good i and import good j.
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2.4.2 Equilibrium with positive trade frictions t2 > t1 > 0
With positive trade frictions and Y1 = Y2, three cases can arise. In Case 1, endowments are
such that LOPDi < MCi in autarky (i.e., (7) and (8) hold with inequality) and no goods are
traded. In Case 2, the endowments imply autarky prices which exceed the marginal cost of
arbitrage for one good but not the other. Consequently, trade occurs in one good but not the
other (one of (7) and (8) holds with equality, the other with inequality). Finally, in Case 3
the endowments imply autarky prices such that the law of one price exceeds MCi ∀i ∈ {1, 2},
both goods are traded. I summarize the equilibrium in all three cases.
Case 1: No trade in goods 1 & 2 The equilibrium conditions are:
γ1p
−θ
1
Y
P 1−θ
= Y1, γ1p∗−θ1
Y ∗
P ∗1−θ
= Y ∗1
γ2p
−θ
2
Y
P 1−θ
= Y2, γ2p∗−θ2
Y ∗
P ∗1−θ
= Y ∗2
γ3
(
Y
P 1−θ
+
Y ∗
P ∗1−θ
)
= Y3 + Y ∗3
where Y = p1Y1+ p2Y2+Y3, Y ∗ = p∗1Y ∗1 + p2Y ∗2 +Y ∗3 , P = (γ1p
1−θ
1 + γ2p
1−θ
2 + γ3)
1/(1−θ) and
P ∗ = (γ1p∗1−θ1 + γ2p
∗1−θ
2 + γ3)
1/(1−θ). Walras’ law implies that the system can be uniquely
solved for prices {p1, p2, p∗1, p∗2}, which recursively define other equilibrium values.
Case 2: No trade in good j In this case, Nj = 0 and the equilibrium is characterized by:
γi (p∗i − I(Ni)ti)−θ
Y
P 1−θ
+ γip∗−θi
Y ∗
P ∗1−θ
= Yi + Y ∗i
γjp
−θ
j
Y
P 1−θ
= Yj and γjp∗−θj
Y ∗
P ∗1−θ
= Y ∗j
γ3
Y
P 1−θ
+ γ3
Y ∗
P ∗1−θ
+ ti
[
Yi − γi (p∗i − I(Ni)ti)−θ
Y
P 1−θ
]
= Y3 + Y ∗3
where Y = (p∗1− I(N1)t1)Y1+p2Y2+Y3), P = (γ1(p∗1− I(N1)t1)1−θ+γ2p1−θ2 +γ3)1/(1−θ) and
I(.) is the indicator function defined in (6). Walras’ law implies that this system uniquely de-
termines {p∗i , p∗j , pj} and consequently all other equilibrium values as functions of preferences,
endowments, and the trade friction ti.
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Case 3: All goods traded Here, equilibrium prices solve the following reduced system:
(p∗1 − I(N)t1)−θ
Y
P 1−θ
+ p∗−θ1
Y ∗
P ∗1−θ
=
1
γ1
(Y1 + Y ∗1 )
(p∗2 − I(N)t2)−θ
Y
P 1−θ
+ p∗−θ2
Y ∗
P ∗1−θ
=
1
γ2
(Y2 + Y ∗2 )
γ3
Y
P 1−θ
+ γ3
Y ∗
P ∗1−θ
+ t1
[
Y1 − γ1 (p∗1 − I(N1)t1)−θ
Y
P 1−θ
]
= Y3 + Y ∗3
where Y = (p∗1 − I(N1)t1)Y1 + (p∗2 − I(N2)t2)Y2 + Y3) and P = (γ1(p∗1 − I(N1)t1)1−θ +
γ2(p2 − I(N2)t2)1−θ + γ3)1/(1−θ). Walras’ law reduces the above system into two equations
that solve uniquely for {p∗1, p∗2} and implicitly all other variables as functions of endowments,
preferences, and the trade frictions.
2.4.3 Properties of the equilibrium
Trade frictions affect equilibrium prices and allocations in all three cases: directly in cases
2 and 3 and indirectly in cases 1 and 2 by defining endowments for which the autarky so-
lutions apply. Furthermore, prices of non-traded good in Case 2 are affected by the price
convergence in traded good. This general equilibrium effect is caused by consumers in ex-
porting country substituting away from traded (whose price rises due to shrinking domestic
supply) into non-traded good and consumers in the importing country moving away from
non-traded into traded good. Consequently, law of one price deviation for the non-traded
good is smaller when the other good is traded than it would have been if both good were not
traded. When endowment shocks are country- or sector-specific, this substitution effect can
induce or suppress trade and affects the dynamic properties of the real exchange rate.
Figure 1 plots the equilibrium law of one price deviations against the endowment differ-
ence. Keeping the endowments Abroad fixed, Home endowments of goods 1 and 2 vary by the
same amount, leading to changes in p1 and p29. In case 1, price differences are smaller than
marginal costs of trade. In case 2, trade occurs for good 1 but good 2 remains non-traded.
When Home exports good 1, p1 rises and p∗1 declines until p∗1 − p1 = t1. Therefore, graph
of LOPD1 has a threshold in case 2. As the demand for non-traded good rises in exporting
9This is the simplest way to perturb the model to illustrate the three aforementioned cases.
9
Figure 1: Model solution: thresholds of price deviations in linear model
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and declines in importing country (due to the aforementioned substitution effect), LOPD2
increases in the endowment difference at a lower rate than when good 1 is not traded. Con-
sequently, slope of LOPD2 is lower in case 2 than in case 1. To the extent that goods are
substitutable, trade in one sector lowers the law of one price deviations in non-traded sec-
tors10. Finally, when the endowment differences induce trade in the second goods, equilibrium
LOPD2 reaches a threshold.
This implies that when shocks to endowments are identical across sectors, goods with
larger trade friction have, on average, larger and more volatile LOPDs. Larger shocks increase
the size of the LOPD but only to the point where arbitrage takes place; excess shock volatility
does not affect the mean nor standard deviation of LOPDs.
3 Arbitrage trade model with adjustment costs to trade
The second model has an identical endowment and preference setting. However, trade costs
also include quadratic adjustment costs in the change of trade volume. Changes in the trade
volume require hiring of labour resources, adjustment in the distribution system and possibly
investment in new (or a changes of the existing) trade infrastructure. Larger swings in trade
10For example, trade in shaving machines would reduce law of one price deviation in barber services.
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volume are therefore more-than-proportionately costly. The arbitrage firms’ problem is now:
max
N1t,N2t
AΠt = max
N1t,N2t
∞∑
j=t
β(j−1)APj
= max
N1t,N2t
∞∑
j=t
β(j−1)
[
2∑
i=1
(p∗ij − pij)Nij − T (N1j , N2j)
]
(13)
s.t. T (N1t, N2t) = t1|N1t|+ t2|N2t|+ c1∆N21t + c2∆N22t (14)
where Nit is the amount of trade in good i at time t from Home to Abroad, T (N1t, N2t) the
total cost function of the arbitrage trading firm and pit the price of good i relative to good
3. The firm has to purchase T (N1t, N2t) units of good 3 to trade {N1t, N2t}11. The total
cost consists of a shipping cost and an adjustment cost. Shipping cost is identical to that
in the first model: ti = awi, i = 1, 2 where wi is the weight of good i and a is a constant.
Adjustment cost is quadratic in the change of volume of trade from the previous period to
the current period12. Parameters ci are not related to the physical characteristics of goods.
The difficulty of summarizing the behaviour of the firm with its first order conditions lies
in the non-differentiability of the absolute value function at 0. A smooth approximation G(.)
to the absolute value function is used to allow a continuous mapping between the first order
conditions and the objective function. Let I(Ni,t) ≡ dG(.) denote the first order derivative
of a ”smooth” absolute value function. I(Ni,t) can be thought of as an approximation to the
indicator function: I(Ni,t) = 1 when Ni,t > 0, I(Ni,t) = −1 when Ni,t < 0 and I(Ni,t) = 0
when Ni,t = 0 (see Appendix A). The first order optimality conditions then yield:
0 =
{
(p∗i,t − pi,t)−
∂T (.t)
∂Ni,t
− βEt∂T (.t+1)
∂Ni,t
}
0 = p∗i,t − pi,t − [tiI(Ni,t) + 2ci(Ni,t −Ni,t−1)]− βEt[−2ci(Ni,t+1 −Ni,t)]
Rearranging, we get
1
2ci
[
p∗i,t − pi,t − tiI(Ni,t)
]
= −βEtNi,t+1 + (1 + β)Ni,t −Ni,t−1
11The simplifying assumption that trade in good 3 is costless remains.
12A quadratic adjustment cost function provides a reduced form which captures firm’s gradual response in
a smoother way than the assumption of a pre-determined volume of shipment (i.a., Ravn & Mazzenga 2004).
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= [−β + (1 + β)B− B2]EtNi,t+1 ∀i
where B is a backshift operator. The quadratic form on the right hand side non-stationary
root allowing us to rewrite the equation as: −(B− 1)(B− β). The first order conditions for
the firm can then be written as
− 1
2ci
[
p∗i,t − pi,t − tiI(Ni,t)
]
= (1− B−1)(1− βB−1)EtNi,t−1 ∀i
Expanding the stable eigenvalue forward and the unstable backward, the first order condition
for the arbitrage trading firm can be re-written in the forward-looking form:
Ni,t = Ni,t−1 +
1
2ci
Et
∞∑
j=0
βj
(
p∗i,t+j − pi,t+j − tiI(Ni,t+j)
)
∀i (15)
The optimal amount of trade in good i in period t depends positively on the volume of
trade in the last period and on the expected future path of price differences in excess of the
trade friction. Firms care about the future path of LOPDs because they prefer to smooth
their trade pattern over time. The size of expected price difference in excess of trade friction
in period t + j increase trade in all periods after t. The expected future direction of trade
EtI(Ni,t+j) is also important: if the firm expects a future price process in which periods with
expected export regime are followed by periods with expected import regime, it optimally
lowers today’s trade volume relative to a scenario in which only one regime prevails.
3.1 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a set of prices and quantities {p1,t, p∗1,t, p2,t, p∗2,t, C1,t, C∗1,t, C2,t, C∗2,t, C3,t,
C∗3,t, N1,t, N2,t, N3,t}∞t=0 such that the representative household maximizes its utility (equa-
tions (1)-(4)), arbitrage trading firms maximize their profits (equation (15) for both goods)
and all markets clear (equations (9) - (11)). It can be simplified into a 4-by-4 system in
{p1,t, p2,t, p∗1,t, p∗2,t}:
∆Yi,t − γi
[
p−θi,t
Yt
P 1−θt
− p−θi,t−1
Yt−1
P 1−θt−1
]
=
1
2ci
Et
∞∑
j=0
βj
[
p∗i,t+j − pi,t+j − tiI(Ni,t+j)
]
, i ∈ {1, 2}(16)
12
γip
−θ
i,t
Yt
P 1−θt
+ γip∗−θi,t
Y ∗t
P ∗1−θt
= Yi,t + Y ∗i,t, i ∈ {1, 2}(17)
where Yt = p1,tY1,t + p2,tY2,t + Y3,t + 12APt, Pt = (γ1p
1−θ
1,t + γ2p
1−θ
2,t + γ3)
1
1−θ and APt are the
contemporaneous arbitrage profits. For goods 1 and 2, equations (16) and 17) represent the
intertemporal and intratemporal equilibrium conditions, respectively.
3.1.1 Intuition
Two pieces of intuition about the influence of adjustment costs can be built by considering a
one-period partial equilibrium version of the model. First, firm chooses a finite trade volume
with adjustment costs while it would chose an infinite trade volume in their absence. Second,
price deviations can exceed shipping costs in equilibrium. Conversely, trade may occur when
price difference does not exceed shipping costs13.
In a one-period version of the model with one good and a positive trade friction t, first
order condition implies: p∗ − p− I(N)t = 2c(N −N−1) where N−1 is the last period’s trade
volume. With c > 0 and |p∗ − p| > t, firm chooses a finite volume of trade that depends
positively on p∗−p and last period’s trade volume N−1, and negatively on the cost parameters
t and c. Figure 2 compares the profit functions between linear and simplified QAC models
Figure 2: Volume and prices become detached due to adjustment costs (N−1 = 0)
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when t = 0.2 and N−1 = 0. The upper segment illustrates situations when price Abroad is
13Note that the quadratic adjustment cost model nests the linear shipping cost model. When c = 0, (16)is
identical to (6).
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30% higher than at Home in autarky and trade takes place. The trade volume in a simple
QAC model is finite because the profit function is parabolic (with a kink). In the lower
segment, p∗ is 15% below p, and no trade takes place.
Because trade is the only source of price adjustment, a smaller trade volume requires a
smaller price adjustment. By lowering trade volume, adjustment costs can sustain law of one
price deviations which exceed threshold t in equilibrium. Although quadratic adjustment cost
model creates the same no-trade region (in terms of price differences) as the linear model,
law of one price deviation can exceed the trade frictions in equilibrium. It can be shown that,
in the one-period model, for any N−1, an increase in home endowment will decrease home
price:
∂pi
∂Yi
= D
[
−2c− t∂I(N)
∂Yi
(
1 +
1
A
)]
where D> 0 and A < −1. Further, LOPD increases in c because a larger adjustment cost
leads to a smaller adjustment in volume.
The intuition changes slightly when N−1 6= 0 because N = N−1+ 12c(p∗−p− I(N)t). The
relationship between N and LOPD is qualitatively unchanged as long as the good remains
traded and I(N) does not change. But the range of autarkic values of LOPD decreases in N−1
(left-hand panel of Figure 3). When N−1 6= 0, costly trade deceleration can imply positive
trade volume even though |p∗−p| < t as the firm strikes balance between contemporaneously
loss-making trade and costs of trade deceleration. Therefore, profits can be negative in
equilibrium when c > 0 (the right-hand panel of figure 3). Larger values of |N−1| require
smaller |p∗ − p| to optimally induce trade.
Figure 3: Trade and profits in partial equilibrium in QAC model for various LOPDs and N−1. c=0.01, t=0.2
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The tendency for price differences to exceed marginal shipping cost is visible in the full
version of the model: the initial law of one price deviations increase in the endowment
difference even when both goods are traded (the ”increasing thresholds” in figure 9). As in
the linear shipping cost model, three cases exist, and the influence of the substitution effect
is visible in the change of the slope of LOPD2 after good 1 becomes traded. Trade volume
depends negatively on frictions c and t. The adjustment costs force firms to spread trade in
more steps of smaller magnitude: length of adjustment time depends positively on c and dYi.
3.2 Solution method
Due to a high degree of non-linearity, the model is solved numerically. First, to limit the
time span for adjustment, I assume a steady state equilibrium to which countries converge
following a shock, and a number of time periods T available for the adjustment. Conditional
on T , the model is solved using method of relaxation by Boucekkine (1995) in which a finite-
period approximation f̂(.)t=1:T = 0 to the system f(.)t=1:∞ = 0 is solved by stacking all
equations for all time periods into one large system F (.) ≡ [f̂(.)t=1 ... f̂(.)t=T ]′ = 0 which is
then solved numerically. Second, in order to compute the Jacobian of the stacked system F (.)
in one step, it is necessary to select a functional form for I(Ni,t). The selection is described in
detail in Appendix A. Third, to facilitate the numerical solver in finding an equilibrium, (16)
is replaced with their simpler forms (18) and (19) which do not include an infinite forward-
looking sum. This step facilitates convergence because an error in pit by the numerical solver
only affects the 4(t − 1) : 4(t + 1) partition of the Jacobian, not all (4T )2 values it would
otherwise14.
1
2c1
(p∗1,t − p1,t − t1I(N1,t)) = (1 + β)Y1,t − βY1,t+1 − Y1,t−1 + γ1p−θ1,t−1
Yt−1
P 1−θt−1
−(1 + β)γ1p−θ1,t
Yt
P 1−θt
+ βγ1p−θ1,t+1
Yt+1
P 1−θt+1
(18)
1
2c2
(p∗2,t − p2,t − t2I(N2,t)) = (1 + β)Y2,t − βY2,t+1 − Y2,t−1 + γ2p−θ2,t−1
Yt−1
P 1−θt−1
−(1 + β)γ2p−θ2,t
Yt
P 1−θt
+ γ2βp−θ2,t+1
Yt+1
P 1−θt+1
(19)
14When T = 30, this translates into 144 rather than 14400 values. The latter prevents convergence even for
relatively small errors.
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A system f̂(.)t=i, part of the large stacked system F (.), consists of equations (18), (19)
and (17). Period T + 1 values found in the inter-temporal Euler equations of f̂(.)T are set
to steady-state equilibrium values associated with a full adjustment to the shock. Finally,
values of I(Ni,t) in the approximate solution obtained above are replaced with 1,−1, or 0
and system F (.) is solved again to ensure that the approximation is valid.
4 Real exchange rate
This section explains the behaviour of the real exchange rate in the model for a range of
parameter values when endowments are stochastic. Logarithm of the real exchange rate from
the model is a weighted average of the three law of one price deviations15: log(RER) =
γ1 log(LOPD1) + γ2 log(LOPD2) + γ3 log(LOPD3). At first, endowments Abroad are fixed
while at Home they follow an AR(1) process: Yi,t = αYi,t−1 + (1 − α)Y¯ + ut i = 1, 2 (ut ∼
N(0, σ2)). The assumption that only one country is subject to the shocks and that both
sectors receive the same shock is relaxed in sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively.
4.1 Real exchange rate in a linear shipping cost model
Persistence of real exchange rate in the linear model increases in shipping costs which deter-
mine the size of a no-arbitrage threshold. This relationship gets stronger as t2/t1 increases,
implying that the heterogeneity of shipping costs increases RER persistence. Finally, per-
sistence decreases in the volatility of endowment shocks because smaller (persistent) shocks
tend to remain longer below the no-arbitrage threshold.
Conditional on the trade friction, persistence of the real exchange rate is positively related
to the persistence of the endowment shock process as measured by α (Table 1). For α ≤ 0.9,
half lives of convergence do not exceed 6 time periods. Half life increases sharply in α
for values near 1, to about 11 when α = 0.95, and up to 933 time periods when α = 0.99.
Variance of shocks decreases half life because it increases the likelihood of triggering arbitrage
and consequently price convergence.
15This is the method of constructing of RER in the empirical literature. Each country j’s CPI is a geometric
average of goods and services with weights corresponding to the consumption shares. Hence, log(CPIjt ) =
γj1p
j
1,t + γ
j
2p
j
2,t + γ
j
3,t. When γi is the same in both countries, the RER result follows.
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Volatility of the real exchange rate increases both in shock persistence α and shock volatil-
ity σ (Table 1). Endowment shocks increase LOPD volatility as long as at least one good is
not traded. When both goods are traded, additional shock volatility is neutral because the
additional price differences are arbitraged away. Higher α leads to longer-lived LOPDs, thus
increasing their volatility, ceteris paribus. This is especially visible when σ is small so that
most shocks leave LOPDs below their thresholds. RER volatility then exceeds σ. Conversely,
high σs only have a marginal effect on std(RER).
Shipping cost increases persistence of real exchange rate for any given α and σ because
it requires a larger endowment shock in order for arbitrage trade to occur. Moreover, het-
erogeneity of the shipping costs increases persistence and volatility of RER because of a
substitution from traded into non-traded good in the exporting country (see the following
sub-section for a more detailed explanation). This yields the increasing loci of persistence
and volatility in t2/t1 (Table 2). The effect is stronger at higher values of α.
4.2 Country-specific shocks
Now let the endowments vary in both countries, assuming they follow a similar AR(1) process:
Yˆi,t = αYˆi,t−1+(1−α)Y¯ + uˆt for i = 1, 2 where Yˆi,t = [Yi,t Y ∗i,t]′, uˆt = [ut u∗t ]′ and uˆt ∼ N(0, Ωˆ)
where Ωˆ =
 σ2 γ
γ σ2
. The left panel of Figure 4 shows that RER persistence increases
in the correlation coefficient η (η ≡ γ
σ2
) while volatility decreases in η. Negatively correlated
shocks lead to relatively larger LOPDs and larger average RER while positively correlated
shocks lead to relatively smaller LOPDs and smaller average RER. With more mass of the
RER distribution near the mean when η > 0, RER deviations do not change much from
one period to another, leading to a more persistent and less volatile RER. When η < 0,
RER distribution has a relatively larger proportion of the mass in tails (near the thresholds).
Repeated draws from this distribution lead to a process with less persistence (deviations
differ from mean more often) and a higher volatility. The monotonicity in average LOPDs
as η increases leads to monotonicity in persistence as well as volatility when shocks are
country-specific.
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The substitution effect from a traded into a non-traded good (case 216) affects the size
of the RER and therefore its persistence and volatility. As the traded good is exported, its
domestic price increases, prompting a substitution to the non-traded good, and increasing
pNT (vice versa in the importing country). Changes in LOPDT and LOPDNT are positively
correlated: as trade lowers |LOPDT | to arbitrage threshold, |LOPDNT | also declines. Thus,
the substitution effect lowers the average |RER|17. Because the proportion of case 2 trades in
all trades increases in η when shocks are country-specific, influence of the substitution effect
on RER is also increasing in η. RER persistence is up to 8% higher and volatily up to 9%
lower as a result of the substitution from traded into non-traded goods.
Figure 4: RER properties with country- and sector- specific endowment shocks in linear
model (shock volatility as a proportion of GDP: σ = 0.034)
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4.3 Sector-specific shocks
Now assume that the endowments differ across sectors. For simplicity, endowments Abroad
are kept constant and Home endowments follow an AR(1) process: Y˜t = αY˜t−1 + (1 −
α)Y¯ + u˜t for i = 1, 2 where Y˜i,t = [Y1,t Y2,t]′, u˜t = [u1,t u2,t]′ and u˜t ∼ N(0, Ω˜) where
Ω˜ =
 σ2 γ
γ σ2
. The right panel of Figure 4 shows the asymmetric U-shaped relationship
between RER persistence and η˜, the correlation coefficient of shocks across sectors. Volatility
16In case 2 when both goods are traded, substitution effect does not have a measureable effect on ex-post
price deviations, only on the volume of trade.
17When α = 0.88, difference in the average |RER| and |RERnoS.E.| increases in η from 3 to 9%.
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of RER increases monotonically in η˜.
When η˜ < 0, shocks to sectoral endowments at Home tend to be of opposite signs, leading
to opposite signs of LOPDs (and the direction of trade flows) of goods 1 and 2. Such LOPDs
partly cancel each other. Therefore, |RER| tends to be closer to zero. When η˜ > 0, shocks
to sectoral endowments at Home tend to have the same sign, leading to LOPDs of identical
signs and a larger average |RER|. From the definition of the shock process, frequency of
{sign(LOPD1)=sign(LOPD2)} increases in η˜, which causes |RER| to be increasing in η˜ also.
This drives the increasing tendency in RER volatility: repetitive draws from a distribution
which is more compressed around its mean (η˜ < 0) lead to a less volatile RER process. As η˜
increases, frequency of situations when both goods are traded in the same direction increases,
and with it the frequency of RER reaching its threshold (γ1t1 + γ2t2). As the mass of the
distribution of |RER| increases around the threshold, RER persistence increases18.
The influence of the substitution effect on RER also depends on the signs of sectoral
shocks. If the shocks are of opposite signs, the positive correlation between changes in
LOPDT and LOPDNT due to substitution effect leads to trade induction. LOPDNT can be
brought to its no-arbitrage threshold and, consequently, become traded. Conversely, if the
sectoral shocks are of the same sign, non-traded good is less likely to become traded. This
trade suppression effect is also a result of the substitution from a traded to non-traded good
in the exporting country19. Trade induction can either increase or decrease |RER|, depending
on which good is not traded. Trade suppression always decreases |RER|. As the proportion
of trade suppression increases in η˜, so does the downward influence of the substitution effect
on |RER| (mean |RER| decreases by 2 to 8% and the standard deviation of RER by 3 to
5%). The shift of the RER distribution away from the RER threshold due to substitution
effect leads to a decline in RER half-life between 1 and 22% (depending on η˜).
Persistence of RER does not imply equal persistence in its components. Moreover, small
RER deviations may be mean reverting because they originate from larger deviations for
individual goods of opposite magnitude - an effect which has been empirically documented
18RER persistence is high when η˜ is close to -1 because {sign(LOPD1)=-sign(LOPD2)} at all times, thus
preventing |RER| to exceed γ2t2 − γ1t1.
19Equivalently, we can think of the effective degree of substitutability between goods depending on trade:
when sectors receive endowment shocks of opposite signs, the ability to subsitute between the products is
limited by the (induced) trade, and conversely with shocks of identical signs.
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by Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2005)20.
4.4 Real exchange rate in a model with quadratic adjustment costs
Real exchange rate in the quadratic adjustment cost model is more volatile and more persis-
tent than in a linear shipping cost model. The additional friction of quadratic adjustment
costs in changes in trade volume reduces profitability of arbitrage, allowing price differences
in excess of the shipping cost in equilibrium (see section 3.1.1 above) and increasing volatil-
ity. Contemporaneous arbitrage profits may be negative because firms balance costs of trade
deceleration with a potentially negative marginal revenue of arbitrage. Persistence increases
because firms adjust to profitable arbitrage opportunity over a longer period of time.
Let the autoregressive endowment process follow Yi,t = αYi,t−1 + (1 − α)Y¯ + ut i = 1, 2
where ut ∼ N(0, σ2), assuming that t ∈ [1, T ] and ut = 0 for t > 1. This T -period simulation
is repeated M times21. Table 3 reports the means of RER half-life and volatility estimates.
As in the linear cost model, half life of convergence decreases in σ and increases in α. The
convergence speed declines in σ at a much slower rate than in the linear shipping cost model.
Adjustment costs increase the half life estimates for any α and σ. Volatility of RER is
higher for any α and σ than in the linear shipping cost model (Table 4). Compared to the
linear shipping cost model, RER volatility is less sensitive to σ. Higher σ leads to higher
LOPD volatility, keeping their ratio unchanged. The standard deviation estimates decline in
α because of a smoother adjustment in prices imposed by the quadratic adjustment costs.
5 Calibration
Preference parameters are calibrated to the usual values in the literature: weights of the
utility function are symmetric (γi = 13 ∀i) and the inverse of the elasticity of substitution
θ assumes the standard value 1.5 (see Chari, Christiano and Kehoe 1994, and McGrattan
1994). Shipping costs are calibrated directly as a tax (a heterogeneous iceberg cost) that
disappears in the course of shipment, assuming they exhibit constant returns to scale. In
20This effect works in the opposite direction to the ”aggregation bias” effect introduced by Imbs et al.
(2003).
21Because of the limit on the number of periods needed for adjustment, results are not perfectly comparable
between the two models. They are less precise in the QAC model.
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particular, they depend multiplicatively on the distance and the weight of a good22. The
US and EU are chosen as locations because of their similar size. Distance between their two
major ports New York and Hamburg (6000km) is used as the shipping distance (most goods
are shipped by sea between Europe and the US).
Marginal shipping costs are calibrated from two sources. In a survey of transportation
modes, Runhaar et. al (2001) quote an average price in 2001 for a standard 40’ container on
a route Rotterdam – Singapore of NLG 3060 (USD 1220), including a fuel surcharge. They
estimate the average load of a 40’ container is 16.25 ton, yielding an average rate of USD
0.0077 per ton per km. Perishable goods such as most of foodstuffs are shipped in chilled
containers. In a survey of shipping costs for fish (chilled) containers Brox et. al. (1984)
survey costs across a range of distances. The implied per ton per km shipping costs is well
approximated by a hyperbolic function (Figure 5). At the 6000km, it implies a unit cost of
USD 0.11 per ton per km between US and Europe. A dataset of physical weights and average
Figure 5: Calibration of per-kg-per-km shipping cost for cooled sea transport
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prices in Berka (2009) implies that 24% of the goods require refrigerating for transport. This
yields an average shipping cost per ton per km of USD 0.033. An average weight of a good in
the dataset is 43kg, and the average price USD 745 (2001 prices). When two weights (20kg
and 66kg) are picked to match the average weight of a good in that dataset, per-kg-per-km
shipping frictions are t1 = 0.0054 and t2 = 0.0174, respectively. That is, about 0.54% of good
1 and 1.74% of good 2 get used in transportation. These cost estimates are conservative
22The CRS assumption is inconsequential, as there is only 1 distance (2 countries). Many authors cali-
brate the transportation costs using indirect estimates. For an example, see Ravn & Mazzegna (2004). The
dependance of shipping costs on weight has been established by many (e.g., see Table 7 in Hummels 1999).
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compared to the literature23. Calibration of the quadratic adjustment cost parameter c
does not appear in the literature. Therefore, c is calibrated indirectly by matching the co-
movement of consumption vectors between the two countries, implying c = 0.2.
The stochastic endowment process at Home is calibrated to match the logged and H-P-
filtered quarterly U.S. GDP series from 1973:1 to 1994:4, implying AR(1) coefficient α = 0.88
and the standard deviation of the residuals equal to 0.8% of GDP. Correlation between
output processes is equal to US-EU output correlation: corr(Y, Y ∗) ≡ η = γ
σ2
= 0.6 (see
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan 2002).
6 Simulation results
6.1 Simulation results in a linear shipping cost model
A bivariate vector of 10,000 normally distributed shocks is used to generate the stochastic
endowment vectors at Home and Abroad: Yˆi,t = αYˆi,t−1 + (1 − α)Y¯ + uˆt for i = 1, 2 where
Yˆi,t = [Yi,t Y ∗i,t]′, uˆt = [ut u∗t ]′ and uˆt ∼ N(0, Ωˆ) where Ωˆ =
 σ2 γ
γ σ2
. Qualitative
properties of the solution are described in section 2.424. Table 5 summarizes statistics of
interest.
6.1.1 Persistence
Persistence of logarithm of the real exchange rate in linear model matches the persistence
in the data, as in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) (”CKM” hereafter). Model’s AR(1)
estimate αˆ = 0.8286 with a standard error 0.0056 implies a half-life of convergence of about
3.7 quarters. Deviations from parity for good 1 are more persistent than for good 2 (AR(1)
slope estimates of 0.7379 vs. 0.847, respectively). This is the core result of the linear model:
heterogeneity in marginal shipping costs leads to persistent RER deviations. The model also
generates consumption and net export correlations that are very close to the data.
23Harrigan (1993) finds transportation barriers of 20%. Hummels (1999) uses 2-digit SITC data to estimate
a transportation costs of 9%. Using 4-digit SITC data, Ravn & Mazzegna (2004) find that the weighted
average of transportation costs declined from 6.31% in 1974 to 3.49% in 1994. IMF frequently uses 11% as a
rule of thumb for transportation costs. All these are greater than the 1.14% average in my calibration.
24Good 1 is traded more frequently (86% of the time periods) than good 2 (32%) (see Figure 7). Distribution
of law of one price deviations in Figure 7 is clearly bimodal, with peaks corresponding to thresholds.
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6.1.2 Comovements
The correlation between NX and GDP is negative, as in the data, but close to zero. This is
caused by the aggregate constraint which requires that the good with the smallest friction
flows in the opposite direction to the flow of the other two goods25. Real exchange rate is
partially disconnected from the real economy. A sufficiently large endowment difference lowers
prices at Home relative to Abroad – a depreciation (increase) in the real exchange rate that
leads to a positive corr(RER, Y ). Real exchange rate is positively correlated with relative
consumption vectors (0.96 compared to -0.35 in data and 1 in CKM) as the expenditure-
switching motive is not sufficiently strong to decouple the two. Correlation of consumptions
between countries is strong (0.62, vs. 0.38 in the data and 0.49 in CKM) because trade
instantaneously eliminates endowments differences that lead to arbitrage opportunities.
6.1.3 Volatility
The risk-sharing role of international trade lowers consumption volatility relative to the en-
dowments to 0.75, bringing it very close to 0.83 in the data. Volatility of trade is then
necessarily slightly higher than in the data (0.19 vs. 0.11). This is in part the result of mod-
eling only the arbitrage motive to trade which can lead to frequent changes and an on/off
trade pattern. Linear shipping cost model does not generate sufficient RER volatility be-
cause it assumes instantaneous adjustment to an endowment shock. Consequently, |RER|
deviation has a well-defined maximum, equal to a weighted average of the trade frictions
(= (t1 + t2)/3)26.
6.2 Simulation results in a quadratic adjustment cost model
The additional friction brings countries’ consumption sets closer to their endowments (see
Section 3.1.1) and therefore leaves equilibrium prices longer and further away from the parity.
Hence, persistence and volatility of RER increase while trade volume declines and becomes
25When goods 1 and 2 do not flow in the same directions, net flow of good 3 depends on the prices of goods
1 and 2 and the volume of trade.
26Nominal rigidities could increase volatility of the price aggregates over that of the endowment shocks.
However, unlike quadratic adjustment costs, nominal rigidities are orthogonal to the mechanism present in
the model.
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smoother.
6.2.1 Persistence and comovements
On average, real exchange rate is marginally more persistent in the quadratic adjustment
cost model than in the data, with an AR(1) coefficient estimate of 0.87. Persistence of
consumptions and net exports is very close to the data, as the consumption risk-sharing role
of trade is reduced. Also the comovement of variables in QAC model is very close to the
data. Correlation of consumptions at Home and Abroad matches the data (this is used to
calibrate c), and corr(RER, Y ) and corr(RER,NX) are both significantly closer to the data
than in the linear model or in CKM.
6.2.2 Volatility
Quadratic adjustment cost model is successful in creating volatility of prices relative to GDP.
The average standard deviation estimate of 7.2 is higher than the 4.4 in the data. Histogram of
all standard deviation estimates (Figure 10) shows that LOPD2 is more volatile than LOPD1,
and that the distribution of LOPDs is bimodal with a larger mass near the thresholds.
The bimodality is not as pronounced as in the linear model because thresholds increase in
endowment differences (Figure 9). Aggregate consumption is more volatile because countries
are more disconnected. On the other hand, small trade volume leads to an insufficient
volatility of net exports. Co-movement of relative consumptions is at 0.28 closer to the data
than it was in the linear model.
7 Conclusions and extensions for future research
This paper studies two general equilibrium models in which persistence and volatility of real
exchange rate in equilibrium is a result of heterogeneity in shipping costs due to importance
of goods’ physical characteristics in shipment. In both models, tradability of a good is en-
dogenously determined by the endowment differences and trade frictions of all goods. Goods
with larger trade frictions need a larger deviation from parity to become traded and are
therefore traded relatively less frequently. Calibration exercise shows that half life of real
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exchange rate deviation can match the estimates observed in the data.
Firms in the second model also pay a quadratic adjustment cost if they change their vol-
ume of trade from one period to the next. Adjustment costs arise from additional legal and
infrastructure expenses or search costs, and are aimed to capture the time dimension of ship-
ping to eliminate the unrealistic assumption of instantaneous adjustment. In the dynamic
non-linear environment, firms’ aversion to react to endowment shocks by large adjustments
in trade volume creates larger and longer-lasting real exchange rate deviations. Adjustment
costs limit trade between countries and the co-movement of their consumption levels. Sim-
ulation results of the second model generates great RER volatility, nearly matches the RER
persistence, and performs very well in bringing comovements of other relevant variables close
to the data. In this sense, heterogeneity in shipping costs is a plausible and an empirically
relevant candidate explanation for the observed persistence and volatility in real exchange
rates.
The importance of modeling heterogeneity of shipping costs is highlighted by the effects of
substitution between traded and non-traded goods in each country on trade volume and price
differences. Consumers substituting away from rising price of the export good increase the
price of a non-traded product. This brings the price difference of the non-traded good further
from the marginal shipping cost and lowers the probability that the good becomes traded.
To the extent that trade adjusts countries economies to shocks, this effect causes a larger
degree of insulation of the economy (a converse result is possible depending on the exact type
of the endowment shock). Equivalently, we can think of the effective degree of substitution
between products as being endogenous to the size of heterogeneous trade frictions.
A Appendix: Approximating the absolute value function
A suitable choice is I(Ni,t) ≡ dG = 2pi arctan(λNi,t) where λ is a choice parameter which
governs the approximation error. An inverse of a trigonometric function tan(x), arctan(x) has
a range of [−pi/2, pi/2] for x ∈ R and is monotonically increasing, continuously differentiable,
and has a convenient property that arctan(x) < 0 when x < 0, arctan(x) > 0 when x > 0 and
arctan(0) = 0. Further, arctan(λx) can reach the bounds arbitrarily fast. Premultiplying
it by 2/pi changes its range to [-1,1], creating a ”continuous step function”. High λ lowers
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the approximation error, as can be seen in Figure 8. A choice of λ = 1040 makes the
approximation error indistinguishable from zero for any feasible stopping criterion of the
numerical solver. However, it is misleading to use this approximation to describe the first
order conditions of a system with |Ni,t| because the absolute value function is not differentiable
at 0. Therefore, a smooth approximation G(Ni,t) to |Ni,t| needs to be constructed first, and
then differentiated. Conveniently, function
G(Ni,t) ≡
∫
g(Nit) =
2
pi
[
λNi,t
(
2
pi
arctan(λNi,t)− 0.5 log(1 + (λNi,t)2)
)]
can be used to arbitrarily closely approximate |Ni,t| by a choice of λ (see figure (6)).
Figure 6: Approximating functions g(N) and G(N) for λ = 105.
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Figure 7: Distribution of trade and price differences. US-EU simulation of the linear model
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Figure 8: Approximating the indicator function in QAC model
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Figure 9: Thresholds in QAC model when c=0.001 and c=0.1
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Figure 10: Distribution of standard deviation and price estimates in a QAC model, c=0.1
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Table 1: log(RER) Half-lives, standard deviation, and the shock process in a linear model
α = 0.65 α = 0.7 α = 0.75 α = 0.8 α = 0.85 α = 0.9 α = 0.95 α = 0.99
log(RER) half-life
σ = 0.008 1.65 1.99 2.44 3.12 4.20 6.16 11.14 933.5
σ = 0.019 1.45 1.72 2.09 2.61 3.36 4.64 7.5 576.9
σ = 0.034 1.26 1.48 1.77 2.15 2.71 3.58 5.53 172.2
σ = 0.068 1.06 1.23 1.46 1.75 2.17 2.8 4.35 60.8
log(RER) standard deviation
σ = 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.015
σ = 0.019 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.017
σ = 0.034 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.020
σ = 0.068 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.020 0.022
Each result is based on 10000 simulations of the linear shipping cost model when t1=0.02 and t2=0.04. α
is the AR(1) coefficient of the shock process, σ is the standard deviation as a proportion of mean GDP.
Table 2: Half-lives of log (RER) and the relative trade
friction in a linear model
α = 0.6 α = 0.7 α = 0.8 α = 0.9 α = 0.99
t2/t1 = 2 1.4 1.9 2.9 5.0 263.5
t2/t1 = 4 1.4 2.0 3.1 6.1 653.4
t2/t1 = 6 1.4 2.0 3.1 6.2 1060.2
t2/t1 = 8 1.4 2.0 3.1 6.2 1641.0
Each result is based on 2000 simulations of the linear shipping
cost model starting from t1=0.02 and t2=0.04. α is the AR(1)
coefficient of the shock process, σ is the standard deviation as a
proportion of the mean GDP.
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Table 3: Mean half-lives of log(RER) in a quadratic model
c=0.01 c=0.1
α = 0.7 α = 0.8 α = 0.9 α = 0.99 α = 0.7 α = 0.8 α = 0.9 α = 0.99
σ = 0.8% 1.9444 3.12 7 – 1.943 3.105 6.567 68
σ = 1.9% 1.9438 3.11 6.8 – 1.9429 3.1048 6.567 66
σ = 3.4% 1.9436 3.11 6.7 – 1.9428 3.1047 6.515 65
σ = 6.8% 1.9433 3.1 6.6 – 1.9428 3.09 6.522 63
Each result is based on 1000 simulations of the model when T = 20, t1 = 0.0054 and t2 = 0.0174 (see
section 5). α is the AR(1) coefficient of the shock process.
Table 4: Volatility of log(RER) in a quadratic model
[Mean std(lRER)]/[Mean std(lGDP)] [Median std(lRER)]/[Med. std(lGDP)]
α = 0.7 α = 0.8 α = 0.9 α = 0.99 α = 0.7 α = 0.8 α = 0.9 α = 0.99
σ = 0.8% 27.62 14.39 12.59 8.49 1.951 1.952 1.953 2.03
σ = 1.9% 17.83 14.88 12.35 8.42 1.950 1.951 1.952 2.08
σ = 3.4% 17.68 14.52 12.24 8.54 1.950 1.950 1.951 2.36
σ = 6.8% 17.07 14.25 12.14 8.75 1.949 1.949 1.950 2.71
Each result is based on 1000 simulations of the model when T = 20, t1 = 0.0054 and t2 = 0.0174 (see
section 5). α is the AR(1) shock coefficient.
Table 5: Properties of the US-EU model simulation
data linear QAC model2 CKMcG3
model1 c = 0.05 c = 0.2
Autocorrelations
Ex. rates & prices
RER 0.83 0.8286 0.868 0.87 0.62
Business cycle stat
GDP 0.88 0.88∗ 0.88∗ 0.88∗ 0.62
Consumption 0.89 0.88 0.854 0.877 0.61
Net Exports 0.82 0.87 0.700 0.78 0.72
STD rel. to GDP
Ex. rates & prices
RER 4.36 0.002 6.41 (1.65) 7.2 (1.82) 4.27
Business cycle stat
Consumption 0.83 0.75 1 1 0.83
Net Exports 0.11 0.19 0.001 0.0004 0.09
Cross-Correlat.
GDPs 0.6 0.6∗ 0.6∗ 0.6∗ 0.49
Consumptions 0.38 0.62 0.28 0.38 0.49
NX & GDP -0.41 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04
RER & GDP 0.08 0.69 -0.02 -0.002 0.51
RER & NX 0.14 0.88 (-0.02) 0.027 0.032 -0.04
RER & Relat. C -0.35 0.96 0.956 0.97 1.00
1 Based on 10,000 simulations of the linear shipping model with parameter calibration described in section 5.
2 Based on 5,000 simulations (T = 30) of the quadratic adjustment cost model.
3 Results of the model simulation in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002).
∗ Denotes a calibrated value.
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